Abstract. We study the controller synthesis problem under budget constraints. In this problem, there is a cost associated with making an observation, and a controller can make only a limited number of observations in each round so that the total cost of the observations does not exceed a given fixed budget. The controller must ensure some ω-regular requirement subject to the budget constraint. Budget constraints arise in designing and implementing controllers for resource-constrained embedded systems, where a controller may not have enough power, time, or bandwidth to obtain data from all sensors in each round. They lead to games of imperfect information, where the unknown information is not fixed a priori, but can vary from round to round, based on the choices made by the controller how to allocate its budget. We show that the budget-constrained synthesis problem for ω-regular objectives is complete for exponential time. In addition to studying synthesis under a fixed budget constraint, we study the budget optimization problem, where given a plant, an objective, and observation costs, we have to find a controller that achieves the objective with minimal average accumulated cost (or minimal peak cost). We show that this problem is reducible to a game of imperfect information where the winning objective is a conjunction of an ω-regular condition and a long-run average condition (or a least max-cost condition), and this again leads to an exponential-time algorithm. Finally, we extend our results to games over infinite state spaces, and show that the budget-constrained synthesis problem is decidable for infinite state games with stable quotients of finite index. Consequently, the discrete time budget-constrained synthesis problem is decidable for rectangular hybrid automata.
Introduction
The controller synthesis problem asks, given a model for a plant, to construct a controller that observes the states of the plant and provides inputs to the plant such that the parallel composition of the plant and the controller is guaranteed to satisfy a given specification, provided, e.g., as an ω-regular set [4, 1, 14, 13] . Controller synthesis reduces to solving two-player games on graphs between a controller and the plant [1, 13, 5] , where a winning strategy of the controller player for the specification gives a controller.
In constructing the controller, the usual assumption is that the controller can observe the system state completely. This assumption, called perfect information, may not hold in many settings of practical interest. For example, an embedded controller may only observe signals up to a finite precision, and a discrete control process may only observe the global state of other processes, not their private variables. Under such observability restrictions, a more relevant model is a game of imperfect information, where the controller only observes a part of the state space, and must construct a winning strategy based only on the observed state.
Games with imperfect information have been studied extensively [15, 13, 10, 11, 2] . Usually, the solution to a game of imperfect information proceeds with a subset construction that reduces the imperfect-information game to a game with perfect information (although on an exponentially larger state space). However, so far, most algorithms make the assumption of fixed partial information. Roughly, it is assumed that of n state bits, the controller can only observe the first k < n bits, and must come up with a strategy that makes its decisions based on this limited observation. In the context of embedded control systems, especially in low-power settings such as embedded sensor and actuator networks [16] , there is often a different kind of partial information. Instead of a fixed set of bits that are visible to the controller in every round of interaction, the partial information can be due to a cost in sensing each bit, and global constraints on the budget available to the controller. For example, in an embedded control system, the controller is free to sense any signal from the system, however, the act of sensing carries a cost (e.g., cost incurred by the energy consumed to sense, or time taken to run the sensing task, or bandwidth required to transmit the sensed value). Thus, in each round, the controller has to make a choice in allocating its resources (energy, time, or bandwidth) to sensing the most crucial data. Moreover, the controller is allowed to select which bits to sense in each round, so the set of bits sensed in one round may be different from the set sensed in the next.
We introduce and study a model of controller synthesis under budget constraints to study imperfect information of this kind. Our model adds a notion of cost associated with controller moves, and the winning conditions constrain possible controls by imposing budgets on the moves either in each round (modeling, e.g., upper bounds on available resources) or in the long run (modeling, e.g., the desire to minimize average cost, or maximize lifetime). In the first model, in each round, the controller may choose to sense a set I of state signals, as long as the total cost of sensing all the signals in I is bounded by B. Practically, the budget represents, e.g., bounds on available energy or bandwidth limitations of the system. Given a two player game with a cost for every state signal, a budget constraint B, and an ω-regular control objective, we construct a B-restricted control strategy that satisfies the control objective while always using at most B cost units at any round, if possible. In the second model, we construct a Blong-run control strategy that satisfies the control objective while maintaining the long-run average cost of sensing below B. Practically, this represents, e.g., control subject to available battery power. With embedded resource-scarce control problems becoming more and more common, our model presents a realistic generalization of classically studied supervisory control problems.
Dually, we study the budget optimization problem, where given the sensing costs for each state signal, we want to find out the minimum budget with which a controller can achieve its goals. Here, we study two different optimization criteria: the first aims to minimize the maximum sensing cost at any single round, the second aims to minimize the long-run average cost of the controller. Optimizations of the first type may be required to find out minimal power or bandwidth requirements for the system: the battery must be able to provide at least this power in order for the controller to effectively satisfy the control objective. Optimizations of the second type are required to maximize the lifetime of the controller.
Technically, there are two steps in our algorithms. For the budget constrained synthesis problem, we construct, from the budget-constrained game, a game of perfect information by a subset construction such that the controller has a winning strategy in the game of perfect information iff it has a winning strategy in the original game. For the budget optimization problem, we perform a similar subset construction, however, the winning objectives on the transformed games are a combination of ω-regular objectives (from the original game) as well as a quantitative requirement to reduce either the maximum cost along the path (corresponding to the first optimization criterion) or the long-run average cost along the path (corresponding to the second optimization criterion). From our reduction and solutions of games of perfect information we obtain that both the budget synthesis and the optimization problem are EXPTIME-complete for ω-regular objectives specified as parity conditions (a canonical form to express ω-regular objectives).
We develop the theory both for finite-state, discrete control problems, as well as for discrete time control for rectangular hybrid automata. In the latter, infinite state case, we show that the control problem can be solved by reducing the system to its stable (bisimulation) quotient. Using known results about stable partitions of rectangular automata [6] , it follows that the budget constrained synthesis problem is decidable for rectangular automata, and indeed, for any infinite state control problem with a stable quotient of finite index.
Definitions
where L is a finite set of states, l 0 ∈ L is the initial state, Σ is a finite alphabet, Δ ⊆ L×Σ ×L is a set of labeled transitions, O is a finite set of observations, and γ : O → 2 L \∅ maps each observation to the set of states that it represents. We require the following two properties on G:
In a game structure, in each turn, Player 1 chooses a letter in Σ, and Player 2 resolves nondeterminism by choosing the successor state. A play in G is an infinite sequence π = 0 σ 0 1 . . . σ n−1 n σ n . . . such that (i) 0 = l 0 , and (ii) for all i ≥ 0, we have ( i , σ i , i+1 ) ∈ Δ. The prefix up to n of the play π is denoted by π(n); its length is |π(n)| = n + 1; and its last element is Last(π(n)) = n . The observation sequence of π is the unique infinite sequence γ
Similarly, the observation sequence of π(n) is the prefix up to o n of γ −1 (π). The set of infinite plays in G is denoted Plays(G), and the set of corresponding finite prefixes is denoted Prefs(G). A state ∈ L is reachable in G if there exists a prefix ρ ∈ Prefs(G) such that Last(ρ) = . The knowledge associated with a finite observation sequence τ = o 0 σ 0 o 1 σ 1 . . . σ n−1 o n is the set K(τ ) of states in which a play can be after this sequence of observations, that is,
In games of imperfect information we are interested in the existence of observation-based strategies for Player 1. A strategy in G for Player 2 is a function β :
, and B G the set of all Player-1 strategies, the set of all observation-based Player-1 strategies, and the set of all Player-2 strategies in G, respectively.
The outcome of two strategies α (for Player 1) and
The outcome of a strategy α for Player 1 in G is the set Outcome 1 (G, α) of plays π such that there exists a strategy β for Player 2 with π = outcome(G, α, β). The outcome sets for Player 2 are defined symmetrically.
Qualitative objectives. A qualitative objective for G is a set φ of infinite sequences of observations and input letters, that is,
We assume objectives are Borel measurable, that is, a qualitative objective is a Borel set in the Cantor topology on (O × Σ) ω [9] . Observe that by definition, for all objectives φ, if π |= φ and γ −1 (π) = γ −1 (π ), then π |= φ. We specifically consider parity objectives [5, 17] . Parity objectives are a canonical form to express all ω-regular objectives [17] and lie in the intersection Σ 3 ∩ Π 3 of the third levels of the Borel hierarchy. For a play π = 0 σ 0 1 . . . , we write Inf(π) for the set of observations that appear infinitely often in
} be a priority function, which maps each observation to a nonnegative integer priority. The parity objective Parity(p) requires that the minimum priority that appears infinitely often be even. Formally,
Quantitative objectives. In addition to parity (ω-regular) objectives, our algorithms will require solving games with quantitative objectives. A quantitative objective for G is a Borel measurable function f on infinite sequences of observations and input letters to reals, that is,
We specifically consider mean-payoff, mean-payoff parity and min-parity objectives. Let r : Σ → R be a reward-function that maps every input letter σ to a realvalued reward r(σ), and let p : O → { 0, 1, . . . , d } be a priority function. We define the mean-payoff, mean-payoff parity and min-parity objectives as follows.
1. Mean-payoff objectives. For a play π = 0 σ 0 1 . . . σ n−1 n σ n . . . the meanpayoff objective is the long-run average of the rewards of the input letters [19] . Formally, for a reward function r : Σ → R, the mean-payoff objective is a function M(r) from plays to reals that maps the play π =
Mean-payoff parity objectives. For a play π = 0 σ 0 1 . . . σ n−1 n σ n . . . the mean-payoff parity objective is the long-run average of the rewards of the input letters if the parity objective is satisfied and −∞ otherwise. Formally, for a reward function r : Σ → R and a priority function p, the mean-payoff parity objective is a function MP(r, p) defined on plays as follows: for a play
objective is the minimum of the rewards of the input letters if the parity objective is satisfied and −∞ otherwise. Formally, for a reward function r : Σ → R and a priority function p, the min-parity objective is a function MinP(r, p) defined on plays as follows: for a play
, and MinP(p, r)(π) = −∞ otherwise. Sure winning and optimal winning. A strategy λ i for Player i in G is sure winning for a qualitative objective φ if for all π ∈ Outcome i (G, λ i ), we have π |= φ. A strategy λ i for Player i in G is optimal for a quantitative objective f if for all strategies λ for Player i we have inf π∈Outcomei (G,λi) 
The following theorem from Martin [12] states that perfect-information games with (qualitative or quantitative) Borel objectives are determined: from each state, either Player 1 or Player 2 wins (for qualitative objectives), or a value can be defined (for quantitative objectives). 
Theorem 1 (Determinacy
inf π∈Outcome(G,α) f (π) = inf β∈B sup π∈Outcome(G,β) f (π).
Imperfect-information to Perfect-information Games
First, we use the results of [2] to show that a game structure G of imperfect information can be encoded by a game structure G K of perfect information such that for every qualitative Borel objective φ, there is an observation-based surewinning strategy for Player 1 in G for φ if and only if there is a sure-winning strategy for Player 1 in G K for φ. We then show that the same construction works for quantitative Borel objectives. We obtain G K using a subset construction. Each state in G K is a set of states of G representing the knowledge of Player 1. In the worst case, the size of G K is exponentially larger than the size of G. Given a game structure of imperfect information G = L, l 0 , Σ, Δ, O, γ , we define the knowledge-based subset construction of G as the following game structure of perfect information:
Notice that for all s ∈ L and all σ ∈ Σ, there exists a set s ∈ L such that (s, σ, s ) ∈ Δ K . Given a game structure of imperfect information G we refer to the game structure G K as Pft(G).
Lemma 2 ([2]
). For all sets s ∈ L that are reachable in G K , and all observa-
By an abuse of notation, we define the observation sequence of a play
As above, we say that a play
The following lemma follows from the results of [2] . Together with Theorem 1, Lemma 3 implies the first part of the following theorem, also used in [2] . The second part of the theorem generalizes the result to quantitative Borel objectives. -winning reduction) . Let G be a game structure, and 
Lemma 3 ([2]). If Player 1 has a sure-winning strategy in

Theorem 2 (Sure
By the first part of the theorem, there is a sure-winning strategy in G K iff there is an observation-based sure-winning strategy in G for the qualitative objective φ. Since is arbitrary, the result follows. It follows from Theorem 2 that to solve a game structure G of imperfect information it suffices to construct the game structure G K of perfect information and solve the corresponding objective on G K .
We now consider game structures whose states are determined by valuations to a set of state variables, and formulate several games of imperfect information by restricting the variables that can be observed.
Games with Variables.
A game with variables consists of: (1) a finite set X = { x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } of n boolean variables; a valuation v is a truth value assignment to all the variables, and we write V to denote the set of all valuations; (2) a finite set Γ of input letters; and (3) a non-deterministic transition function δ : V × Γ → 2 V \ ∅ given a current valuation and an input letter gives the non-empty possible set of next valuations. We specify the games with variables as a tuple G = (V, Γ, δ). We introduce some notation. Given a natural number n we denote by 
. , d } be a priority function derived from p as follows: for a non-empty set
Y ⊆ V we have p(Y ) = max{ p(v) | v ∈ Y } if p(v) is even for all v ∈ Y ; otherwise p(Y ) = min{ p(v) | v ∈ Y, p(v) is odd }.
There is a [k]-restricted strategy for the controller in G to satisfy the objective Parity(p) iff there is a strategy in
G K = Pft( G [k] ) to satisfy Parity( p).
Example 1. Consider a plant with variables
is the set of public variables that can be accessed by the controller and all the other variables are private, i.e., cannot be accessed by the controller. Games with fixed-partial-information provide an appropriate framework to model the interaction of the controller and the plant.
Games with Budget Constraints. We now consider games with variables where the set of variables that the controller can observe is not fixed, but there is a hard constraint on the amount of information that the controller can observe at any round. We will again present a reduction to games of imperfect information, but the reduction is more involved than the case of fixed partial-information. 
Games with hard constraints. Let
For a state (l, I) if an input letter σ from Γ is chosen, then a next state l is possible iff l ∈ δ(l, σ). For a state l ∈ V the input letter can be chosen as a subset I such that c(I) ≤ B, and the next state is (l, I). Observe that we assumed that input letters from Γ can be chosen at states (l, I), and at states from V a subset I of [n] can be chosen. However, this can be easily transformed to a game where at every state all input letters are available as follows: we add an auxiliary state that is losing for the controller, and at a state if an input letter is not available, we make it available and add a transition to the losing state. For simplicity, we ignore the details of this reduction.
The set of observation-based strategies of G B represents the set of Brestricted strategies. Let G K be the perfect-information game obtained from the subset construction of G B , i.e., G K = Pft(G B ). 
Theorem 4. Let G = (V, Γ, δ) be a game with variables with a cost function
There is a B-restricted strategy for the controller in G to satisfy the objective Parity(p) iff there is a strategy in G K to satisfy Parity(p).
Example 2.
Consider the interaction of a controller with a plant with variables { x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } where all the variables are public. Assume the variables are accessed through a network with a bandwidth constraint B. Let c be a cost function that associates with a variable x i the cost c(i) that specifies the bandwidth requirement to access variable x i . The games with hard-constraints provide the right framework to model such interactions.
Budget Optimization Problems. We now consider games with softconstraints. These are games with variables with a cost function on variables. In contrast to games with hard-constraints where the budget B is a hard-constraint, in games with soft-constraints the controller can choose to know the value of a subset I of variables and incur a cost c(I), and the goal is to either minimize the long-run average of the cost, or minimize the maximum cost, along with satisfying a given parity objective. A strategy in such games is called soft-constrained if whenever it asks for the valuation of a set I of variables, then it only observes the valuation of the set I of variables. 
Observe that in item 1 of Theorem 5 the right-hand side is − λ 2 instead of −λ. This is because in the modeling of a game with variables with soft-constraints, each step of the original game is simulated in two-steps rather than one, and hence we need a factor of 2 in the result. If the goal is to minimize the averagepower consumption, then the long-run average criterion is appropriate, and if the goal is to minimize the peak-power consumption, then the appropriate objective is to minimize the maximum cost.
Solution of perfection-information games.
The results of [3] present solutions of perfect-information games with mean-payoff parity objectives. The result of Theorem 5 present a reduction of games with variables with soft-constraints to minimize long run average of the costs along with satisfying a parity objective to perfect-information games with mean-payoff parity objectives. Theorem 5 also presents the reduction of games with variables with soft-constraints to minimize the maximum cost along with satisfying a parity objective to perfect-information games with min-parity objectives. We now briefly describe how to use solutions of perfect-information parity games to obtain solutions of perfect-information min-parity games. The solution of perfect-information games with min-parity objectives can be obtained as follows: (a) sort the rewards on the edges; (b) with a binary search on the range of rewards, keep only edges above a certain reward value and solve the resulting qualitative parity game. The solution of perfectinformation games with parity objectives is widely studied in literature, see [8, 18, 7] for algorithmic solution of perfect-information parity games. Hence perfectinformation min-parity games with n states and m edges can be solved with log(m) calls to perfect-information parity games. It may be noted that from the above solution we can find the the minimum budget B that is required to satisfy games with variables with hard-constraints to satisfy a given parity objective.
Computational complexity. It follows from the results of [2, 15] that games with fixed-partial information are EXPTIME-hard even for reachability objectives. The games with fixed-partial information can be obtained as a special case of games with budget constraints as follows: set the budget as B = k, and the cost for bits 1, 2, . . . , k as 1, and k + 1 for all other bits. Hence it follows that games with budget constraints are EXPTIME-hard; and it also follows that the budget optimization problem is EXPTIME-hard for reachability objectives (and also for the more general parity objectives). From Theorem 4, Theorem 5, and the solution of perfect-information games we obtain an EXPTIME upper bound for the solution of games with budget constraints and the budget optimization problem. Thus we have the following result. 
Discrete Time Control of Rectangular Automata
We now apply the theory of controller synthesis with budget constraints to the discrete time control problem for rectangular automata [6] . We obtain our results using a general decidability result about imperfect-information games on infinite state spaces that have a stable partition with a finite quotient.
R-stable games. In this section we drop the assumption of finite state space of games. Let G = L, l 0 , Σ, Δ, O, γ be a game structure of imperfect-information such that L is infinite. Let R = { r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r l } be a finite partition of L. A set Q ⊆ L is R-definable if Q = r∈Z r, for some Z ⊆ R. The game G is R-stable if the following conditions hold for all σ ∈ Σ: (a) the set { l ∈ L | ∃l ∈ L.(l, σ, l ) ∈ Δ } is R-definable; (b) for all r ∈ R, the set Post G σ (r) is R-definable; (c) for all r, r ∈ R, if for some x ∈ r we have Post 
